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De Servo Arbitrio: 
The End of Liberty 
in Martin Heidegger 
Eugenio Mazzarella 
Time, history and being are key words in the Heideggerian 
canon. Grasping the web inscribed by these guiding words is for 
Heidegger tantamount to touching the very thing of thinking. What 
calls for this tampering is a necessity of thinking, which is to know 
itself and its most intimate possibilities. This is especially true today 
when thinking is the thinking of a world which for over a century now 
finds itself bound by the constrictions of its planetary interconnexions, 
assuming them as a destiny. A destiny in which technology is no 
longer understood as an immobile mainspring but as a loaded gun or 
primary engine. In these straits thinking must still essay to know 
something about the status of its link to Being, at a time when this link 
-- which is originary to philosophy -- is, even after historical con-
sciousness, even after Heidegger, wholly historically articulated. 
Whether thinking, or human thought, is in some guise master of 
itself, or free, -- to say it with a word that is Christian, or at the very 
least referenced to an ontology of chance, of the occurrence as arbitrio, --
or whether it is bent on the mere reflection of necessity, is a question 
that can be decided on the basis of how this historical articulation of 
Being and thinking is concretely thought. If we assume, with 
Heidegger, that 
the analysis of the historicity of Dasein will show that this entity is not 
'temporal' because 'it stands in history', but that, on the contrary, it 
exists historically and can so exist only because it is temporal in the very 
basis of its Being, 1 
the real issue then becomes: what is the meaning of existing historical-
ly? Will it mean, against this foundation, being-dependent or being-
free? Yet, in concreto, in concrete existence, the question is decided on 
the practical side of analysis, in the effective and unthought decision. 
If the definition of philosophy as universal and phenomenologi-
cal ontology and stemming from the hermeneutics of Dasein assumes 
thematically that the analytic of existence (insofar as a showing of the 
constitution of the Being of Dasein), remains only one way of the 
research, the problem for us becomes that of seeing how a philosophi-
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cal inquiry returns to its place of origin, existence, once the sense of 
Being has been made manifest. 
Everything revolves around the specific results of the program-
matic structure of the inquiry in Being and Time, as is expounded in 
paragraph eight, especially the first part. That is, on the way the 
results of the first and second section ( care, Sorge, and temporality, 
Zeitlichkeit) are related to the horizon of the third part, the Temporalitiit, 
which was not written in 1927 but much later and known as Time and 
Being. 
It is well known how Heidegger connects the results of the first 
section, concerning the unitary structure of Dasein, Sorge, with the 
conclusions reached at the end of the second section, which deals with 
its sense, or temporality . If care is "the formal existential totality of the 
whole of the ontological structures of Dasein," "the having before 
being already (a world) insofar as being-alongside (the entity met 
within the world,' 1 ) (SZ, § 41) in the concreteness of existence, the 
sense of the Dasein is manifested (as care which decides under the 
urgency of anxiety) through the assumption, on the part of the existing 
being, of its own temporality, Zeitlichkeit, in the self-appropriating tem-
porality of the event (situation and occurring). 
It is with the above determination of the Zeitlichkeit as the sense 
of the being of Dasein that Being and Time concludes. Yet this leaves 
open the question of the anchoring -- which is the declared aim of the 
Seinfrage -- of the sense of being of Being in relation to the sense of 
Being in general, a mooring which requires a more precise determina-
tion of the latter. However, leaving the question open does not pre-
judge possible developments. 
Here a prejudice might reside in the fact that the sense of the 
being of Being is insufficiently determined the moment it is reduced, 
as in Being and Time, to a Zeitlichkeit in which temporality and spatiali-
ty of Being are not thought as co-originary and co-structuring the 
being of Being. The rethinking of the rapport between spatiality and 
temporality in the structure of the being of Being must be entrusted to 
an amplification of the ontologically disclosing character of Dasein, 
being-there (for entities as well), especially if directed toward the work 
of art. It is this redefinition in terms of the spatio-temporal character of 
Being-there that allows for the realization [esecuzione = execution, car-
rying out] of the Question of Being as anchorage of Dasein to Being. It 
is precisely the tempo-spatial trait that makes human Dasein and 
Dasein in general ontologically coherent with the being of Being, with 
its originary modality as aperture, which constitutes originary spatio-
temporality, clearing of the origin, event that tempospatializes and 
spatiotemporalizes, in short the originary self-manifesting of Being 
which in its withdrawing allocates to itself the totality of entities. 
Otherwise put, this represents the concrete manifestation of the turn 
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that occurs between Being and Time and Time and Being, a showing of 
the circularity that exists in the appropriating-disappropriating 
dynamic of Being thought as Event. Of this redefinition of the 
Question of Being Heidegger offers a final version in the 1962 confer-
ence Time and Being, which we may take as a synthetic yet complete 
third part of the project begun in 1927. 
In this context, the Zeitung der Zeitlichkeit of Dasein rethought in 
its co-originary spatiality is here shown as rooting itself in the struc-
ture of Being as Anwesen, as a coming to presence of the three direc-
tions of temporal-spatial ecstasies of Being itself. This Anwesen is really 
Zeit-Raum, the free space of time, Dimensione, originary ekstatikon in 
which rests the ekstatikon that makes up the sense of the being of 
Dasein. In the ekstatikon the tridimensionality of the ecstasies is reunit-
ed in an originary and structuring quadridimension, the cogent corre-
spondence of the ecstasies, which constitutes their cogent co-determi-
nation and, in their extension, the reciprocal determining factor, or the 
fact of their reciprocal necessity. This fourth dimension, that is, neces-
sity, is actually the first of the four, "the bringing that determines all 
else". 2 The Anwesen is the bond, the Janus head, time itself become 
world that links the spatio-temporality of Dasein to the Urphiinomen, to 
the Ursache of the Lichtung and wherein Es gibt Sein, Es gibt Zeit. This 
Ursache is the Gabe, which Heidegger modulates in the doctrine of the 
Ereignis as "destination" ("Schicken") of being, as time in the sense of 
the freeing bringing in the Open. (SD 18) In the giving of the Es gibt 
Sein "as destining and as gathering of the destinations ... [what is] 
ordained each time in a destiny is the presence of Being in its epochal 
changes." (SD 17) 
By means of this doctrine of the Ereignis as a marker of the 
Geschick of Being which assigns to itself every possible history 
Heidegger succeeds in "elaborating the Temporality (Temporalitiit) of 
Being." (SZ § 5) With this development the phenomenological ontol-
ogy planned in Being and Time is accomplished: Heidegger's specific 
brand of phenomenology, its "theoretical" reason at least, appears 
legitimately to subside. The thought that sees has followed the phe-
nomenon of Being to the last trace of the visible, along the guiding 
thread of time. Beyond that trace, where the phenomenon of Being 
"turns" upon itself, subtracting itself (as Enteignis) from sight, it is no 
longer possible to strive for a thought which intends to remain philo-
sophically true to a universally communicable seeing undergoing the 
rigors of a "scientific" exhibition, to be shared through discourse, or 
loyal to a known verdict on the non transience (for finite knowledge) 
of the Absolute. 
It is precisely here, however, at the place where Heidegger's theo-
retical reason calms down and all but vanishes, that a task arises for 
thinking, for our practical reason. 
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The moment has come for us to go all the way and attempt to fig-
ure out what is the meaning of existing historically for a Dasein whose 
temporal ecstaticalness is rooted in the ecstases of Being as sending 
and destiny. The problem facing us, therefore, is to verify whether 
Heidegger's way of thinking this rootedness of the Dasein in Being 
does not end up being a crucifixion of the Zeitlichkeit of human Dasein 
upon the Temporaliti:it of Being. In other words, the question is whether 
Heidegger's freedom of the Dasein bears in its bosom the self-central-
izing action of chance, of the libero arbitrio, or whether it doesn't actual-
ly relinquish this possibility in favor of the phenomenological rigor of 
theory as a thinking which conceives of Being reflexively, perhaps 
embracing it without reservations. Of course this may be read as the 
transcription of an intolerable anxiety for this mode of thinking, the 
anxiety for freedom which is proper to a man facing either the person-
al, free God (a free god who freely creates a man who is free even 
before god), or the radical nothingness of a nihilism of the world bereft 
even of the last, ancient god: the necessity of the world, the how of its 
holding together. 
My thesis is that the freedom of the Heideggerian Dasein is a 
freedom which is merely "reflexive," which is reflection of and adher-
ence to the freedom of Being as it manifests itself. It is a freedom 
which is bound phenomenologically. If we bear in mind Heidegger's 
critique of Husserl's eidetic reason, it is paradoxically the link of the 
eidos which forces thinking to say yes to it: the manifest historicity of 
the event that becomes the thing itself of thought, and a determining 
factor. Understood in the wake of the freedom of thought as freedom 
from the lack of awareness, from the darkness of cognitive egoism, 
radical jahsagen to one's situation in the world, Heidegger's freedom is 
nothing other than the acceptance of truth understood as manifesta-
tion, the freeing of Being in the beings. Despite his critique of the tradi-
tional notion of truth as the conformity of thought to thing, Heidegger 
is still operating in the shadow of this very notion, albeit ontologically 
radicalized. The freedom of the Dasein is for him solidly anchored to 
an idea of freedom as conforming to Being, ultimately to the eidos of 
the event, despite the fact that this eidos is thought in a kairological 
manner, in the imperscrutable certainty of its when and why. Of the 
Christian kairological appeal what fails is the essential postulate, the 
eventfulness of the answer which may actually not be given. Yet with 
this possibility what falls apart is Christian freedom itself, the freedom 
of faith, which always requires the essential invisibility of the things 
believed in. This is an entirely Greek answer to the anxiety of faith, or 
if we prefer an answer to the essential freedom in nothingness. Being 
certainly no longer needs justification -- god cannot be sought through 
the pietas of Job or the Quolehet. Yet for this ultimate pietas of thinking 
toward god or toward Being, which no longer calls for judgment, in 
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the end what is required is adequation to the dicta of the "seen" of 
Being in order to be justified in terms of pietas. What permeates this 
perspective is still the mythology of the eye which does not mislead if 
only it is purified by vision. The faith in invisible things -- non verifi-
able or vivified faith, ex auditu in one's own conscience -- is the unten-
able territory of Heideggerian anxiety which, beyond radical nothing-
ness, exhibits the binding necessity of the event given to the gaze. 
This "reflexive" determination of the freedom of Being on the 
part of the freedom of the Dasein is directly influenced by the 
Ontological equivalences that Heidegger sets up between Being and 
being, manifestation, truth, freedom. Freedom is but "a free yielding to 
a conformity which obliges:" a yielding which is "possible only if we 
are free for that which manifests itself in a disclosure. This being-free 
expresses the essence of freedom which until today has remained mis-
understood: the opening of the relating that makes conformity intrinsi-
cally possible is founded on freedom: the essence of truth is freedom. 3 
And further on, we read that 
'man does not possess' truth, if anything he is truth, the ek-sistent and 
un-concealing Dasein [which] possess man in a more originary way so 
that it can, by itself, gard and garantee for humanity the relationship to 
being as such in its totality. .. freedom understood as the letting-be of 
being, sets forth and realizes the essence of truth in the sense of the 
unconcealing of being. (WW, p. 190) 
As can be gleaned from these texts, it is not only the conformity 
of logical truth which is possible solely upon the foundation of onto-
logical truth (freedom as the manifestation of Being, its giving itself 
freely in the clearing that allows being to come forth), but moral truth 
and freedom as well. The link is all the more cogent as it is imper-
scrutable. The kairological element of the Geshick of Being, of the 
decree of Being, does not lend itself to comprehensive analysis or to 
discoursive reason, but only to suggestions, to hints of thought. 
Moreover, it does not lend itself to intuition or to a seeing within the 
occurrence, preferring rather to emerge with some aspect, from every-
thing that thinking can touch insofar as presence, to a beckoning 
toward what befalls us, to ourselves, to meditative clues that hover 
about. Heidegger's relationship to Being is aptly described by Rilke: "I 
fly about God, around the ancient tower, and I fly along the centuries." 
It is only upon this "we ourselves" as weltet, that is, as Selbstwelt, 
Mitwelt, Umwelt, that it is possible to unfold a continuing analysis. Yet 
in the Heideggerian perspective this analysis shows an originary reci-
procal link that extends from the necessary and cogent factual coexis-
tence of these concentric spheres to the reciprocal co-determination 
within the intimate sphere of the Selbstwelt, in that existential seed 
which makes it authentic: decision. In the existential concreteness of 
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the Dasein, the care that decides assumes upon itself its own temporal-
ity: for at the urgency of anxiety, one must decide for something, and 
this something is time, one's proper time, being insofar as it gives itself 
as past, as present, as future. Heidegger's assumption that temporality 
is part of the care that decides, is grounded entirely on the necessary 
co-determination and reciprocal necessitating of the ecstasies. In its 
ontological fullness, that is, in its deliberate awareness, the ecstatic 
Zeitlichkeit is here nothing but re-flection of the ecstatic Temporalitiit of 
Being. The way in which there's no horizontal caesura between the 
ecstasies of the Zeitlichkeit, in like manner there's no vertical caesura 
between the complex of these ecstasies and the ecstaticalness of Being. 
The problem of human freedom, on the other hand, would con-
sist in inserting a caesura in this corraling of human freedom toward 
the reflexivity of the freedom of Being, and within the same co-exsten-
sivity of the temporal ecstasies of the Zeitlichkeit of Dasein. A caesura 
right in the necessity of the continuum Being-Dasein and of the contin-
uum of Being with itself. In other words, it becomes a question for 
Dasein to recover that characteristic of Enteignis, and of withdrawing 
from the continuum of Being, that arbitrary withdrawing which is in 
Being itself. Again, our goal is: to recuperate for human Dasein its ver-
i tati ve character, free to refuse to submit to the reflection of the 
announcing of Being, the free choice (arbitrio) of denying this 
announcing in favor of another one, even if it is posited by itself to 
itself. The identity of Being and thinking, which is onto-logic co-
belonging, cannot be resolved in an excessive Parmedian 
(pseudo )moralistic intellectualism, in a common moral identity. 
When framing man's being within Being, and thinking as action 
(and as moral action) is effectively reduced to the reflexivity of the 
ontic, then there's nothing left of concrete human freedom. Thinking 
can be denken as danken, "serving that frees" 4 within the ontological 
realm, not the moral one. In this case thinking may at best free us 
from the anxiety of a truly moral way of thinking by linking up with a 
choice which we wish to be "right" insofar as being merely taken, 
even within the spiritual storm of the ineluctable. Free moral thinking 
is instead a lordly thinking which does not possess the fallacious pietas 
that relinquishes its sovereignty, and which refuses to take refuge in 
the binding force of a decree -- what to all effects amounts to an 
expected excusatio, for when matters unfold in an unwanted manner, 
one can always say "I was following an order." Moral thinking is 
always open, constitutively a crossroads whereupon we can be lost. 
There is no other moral way of thinking. Of course we can always fol-
low precepts, or a venerable tradition, or even accept the divine word 
as revealed and unquestionable truth. Yet once again the question 
whether action taken is really moral -- intentionally, beyond actual 
effects, beyond any discourse on the responsability of the effects -- is 
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something that can be known only a posteriori: the certainty of heartfelt 
judgment is always also a judgment dependent on timeliness, or on 
the appropriateness of time. The peculiar anxiety of Heideggerian 
ontology is actually a fleeing from this anxiety, which is dependent 
upon time and wherein my freedom yields itself as truth. 
Because in concrete, historical existence to decide is always to 
decide for the being which is given as past, present, or future, and 
which as ecstasy colors all other ecstasies, action, choice itself, the 
resulting anxiety yields an ontologization of the present, of what hap-
pens now, rooted not in the future (which would correspond to hope 
in Christianity, to the awaiting the result of my present decision), but 
in the past, in the ctonic weight of having-been. In the concrete indeci-
sion of the present, of the now, the anxiety of the ineluctable is not as 
great, for this Stimmung, as the pure anxiety of the future. In fact, it 
seems to give this anxiety a reassurance: I will be because I have-
always-been. To partake of a destiny is still more reassuring than risk-
ing not having any. 
What the nature of time is on a formal plane has already been 
grasped and described once and for all by St. Augustine: ecstasy of 
past-present-future (such at least is the apperceived structure of our 
present consciousness, of the mind that follows the collapse of the 
bicameral mind). But is time, in its concreteness, solely this formal 
structure? The answer is clearly no. This structure is full of content, it 
is a content: the content of the decision here and now of a sliver of 
time. This decision, the tooth in the wheel of time, strikes on the past, 
or the present, or the future. In the Christian version of time, one of its 
fundamental modalities is the beating on the future that guides the 
rolling of the wheel. Every decision, decision-time, is ancient (then), 
monumental (now as then) or critical (cut the now with a new now, so 
that there is no longer a word: then, now?), the clearing of a passage in 
the necessitating continuum. 
At this juncture, that the ontological reflexivity of Heideggerian 
freedom ends up yielding on the ontic plane to the ctonic weight of the 
past is, in Heidegger's mind, a matter not only of fact (its specific polit-
ical result), but of right. Heidegger's ontological freedom as "conscious 
staying-inside the being in its totality, which must be borne," 5 a realiza-
tion of Being in us for which the resolved Dasein finds itself always 
already decided, has at its side the structure of Schelling's freedom 
from the 1809 treatise, to which Heidegger dedicates a symbiotic com-
mentary. Here also, in Schelling's words, 
the single action follows from the inner necessity of being free .. which 
should not be misunderstood ... with the empirical necessity based on 
costriction: ... This inner necessity is itself liberty, man's being is essen-
tially his own act: necessity and liberty are between themselves as a sin-
gle being, and it is only if looked at individually that they seem to be 
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different: but in itself it is liberty, formally is is necessity ... in the origi-
nal creation, man is un undecided being, but he can decide for himself. 
Yet this decision cannot happen in time, but falls outside any time, it 
doesn't itself belong to time, but to eternity ... • 
As we can see, it is the monogram of the resoluteness of Being 
and Time that engages in the "ineluctable" of the historical decision of 
the German Dasein of the thirties of being for oneself, of assuming 
one's proper essence when facing nothingness, at the risk of dissap-
pearing on the scene of the being: the monogram of secularization, in 
the Weimer climate, of the specific Schellingian curvature of the pre-
destination which "saves" freedom by making of the man who acts 
thus here the man who has acted since eternity and already in the 
beginning of creation. From its inception the German Dasein has cho-
sen to be such, once it has been thrown into beings. And today's 
choice, the today of 1933, of the Discours der Rektorat on the self-affir-
mation of the German university, is simply the confirmation of 
German Dasein's having been wanted to be from the very beginning. 
But this liberty as agreement with the dictates of a root which is 
effective influence of the past upon the now-choice for a future, which 
removes from this future the novum of hope in order to consign it to 
the execution of a dictate, and which at most has been desired solely in 
the dimension of the immemorial, this liberty is no less than the free-
dom-necessity of private Dasein. Its only mode of subsisting, if it were 
to be authentic, is by the appropriation of a link to human will which 
lies outside of it yet constitutes its truth. Thereby disclosing the con-
strictions of a fate that rebukes the essential responsibility of salvation, 
or the chance of losing oneself as a real alternative. It is more a subtle 
proud and nihilistic gesture, the assumption of the inexplicable in 
terms of the ineluctable,than a true letting oneself be that, understand-
ing not, yet entrusts itself to a mimesis of faith as trust, the 
Heideggerian Gelassenheit. 
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